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Abstract 
New network based authentication mechanisms are beginning to be implemented in 
industry.  This project investigated different authentication technologies to see if and how 
Sandia might benefit from them.  It also investigated how these mechanisms can integrate 
with the Sandia Two-Factor Authentication Project.  The results of these investigations 
and a network authentication path forward strategy are documented in this report. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Mobile Computing Initiative is to provide the necessary connectivity to facilitate a 
new culture of mobile employees, including higher user productivity, enhanced quality of 
work, increased flexibility, and greater employee satisfaction.  One piece of that initiative 
is this project, the Network Authentication Investigation. 
 
New network based authentication mechanisms are beginning to be implemented in 
industry.  Network based authentication protocols, such as 802.1x, provide increased 
network security by authenticating the machine and/or user prior to providing access to 
any network resources.  Network based authentication may also provide some additional 
capabilities, such as remediating and patching unpatched/un-updated computer systems 
prior to them accessing internal Sandia networks. 
 
This project investigated different authentication technologies (especially 802.1x port 
authentication and network node validation and remediation solutions) to see if and how 
Sandia might benefit from them.  It also investigated how these mechanisms can integrate 
with the Sandia Two-Factor Authentication Project.  The results of these investigations 
and a network authentication path forward strategy are documented in this report. 
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2 Network Authentication Technology 
2.1 Purpose and Overview 
 
This section is intended to describe the current state of network authentication 
technology.  This section surveys the existing technologies, their advantages, their 
disadvantages, and describes equipment suitable for use with some of these technologies. 
2.2 Types of Network Authentication 
2.2.1 802.1x 
 
The 802.1x protocol uses EAPOL (Extensible Authentication Protocol Over LAN) to 
authenticate users to a network on a port by port basis.  It is possible to implement 802.1x 
via wireless or wired network configurations.  This overview covers the wired side 
implementations.  
 
There are three major components when using 802.1x authentication.  They are the 
supplicant, the authenticator, and the authentication server.  The supplicant is the client 
attempting to gain access to the network, the authenticator is the 802.1x enabled switch, 
and the authentication server is a backend device such as a RADIUS server that does the 
actual authentication. 
 
In an 802.1x enabled network, switch ports are configured to be disabled until a 
successful authentication occurs.  When in the disabled mode, the port is considered to be 
in an uncontrolled state.  During this phase the switch will only allow EAP (Extensible 
Authentication Protocol) messages to be sent over the uncontrolled port.  Upon 
successful authentication, the authentication server sends an access accept message to the 
switch, which then opens the specific port to which the client is connected, for all 
protocols and places it in a controlled state.  
 
When a client first connects to the port, it sends an EAP request to the switch, which then 
forwards the request to the authentication server.  Upon receiving the request the 
authentication server sends a response with a challenge in it for the client to send its 
credentials.  The client then sends its credentials to the server, which will accept or reject 
the client. 
2.2.2 Static Password 
 
The purpose of a password is to prevent unauthorized people from accessing files, 
systems, or networks.  It also authenticates authorized users, since only that user is 
supposed to know the corresponding password.  In her 1982 book [4], Dorothy Denning 
describes login protocols using passwords.  These have not changed much over the years. 
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In static password systems, a password is assigned to each user and is changed either 
periodically or aperiodically by the user, depending on local policies.  These passwords 
may be stored in memory or on disk in cleartext or encrypted form.  Another storage 
method is to encode the password and then using the encoded password to encrypt a 
known block of data (such as a block of zeros) [7].  At login time, this is compared to an 
encryption performed on the same known block using the encoded form of what the user 
entered for his password, as the encryption key.  If the results match, the user is allowed 
to proceed. 
2.2.3 One Time Passwords 
 
A one time password (or single use password) is a password that changes with each use.  
Each time a user correctly presents their password to the authentication system, it 
changes [6].  In this way, even if a password is observed by “shoulder surfing” or 
network sniffing, it’s no longer of use because the authentication system has cycled to the 
next password in the list or algorithm. 
 
Some one time password systems are single factor systems using prepopulated lists of 
passwords.  Most one time password systems operate on the principle of two-factor 
authentication, requiring something you have, such as a token card, and something you 
know, for example a personal identification number (PIN) [3]. 
2.2.4 Network Node Validation 
 
Last year vendors began advertising new and upcoming solutions that aim to provide 
enterprises with better network access control.  These new solutions, commonly referred 
to as network node validation (NNV) or network access control (NAC), provide network 
access control decisions based upon the credentials of the computer and/or user of the 
computer and the health, or security posture, of the computer.  In addition to the 
individual vendor products, the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) working group of the 
Trusted Computer Group (TCG) has recently created an open, standards-based 
architecture for endpoint security and access control.  This architecture should promote 
interoperability between network infrastructure vendors and end-point security vendors. 
 
Another major component of the NNV is the ability to remediate or quarantine a virus or 
worm infected client prior to allowing access to the internal network.  This allows 
enterprises to ensure that all machines are patched, have current signature files for anti-
virus and host-based intrusion detection, and have anti-virus, firewall, and intrusion 
detection running.  Infected or unpatched machines would be cleaned or patched prior to 
allowing network access to the internal network. 
 
Two major products in this category are the Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) 
framework and the Symantec-owned Sygate Universal NAC.  Both products operate 
similarly, and in addition to the main functionality of NNV, these products also permit 
dynamic VLAN and ACL assignment based upon the credentials of the user or the 
posture of the computer.  Figures 1 and 2 detail the step-by-step operation of both the 
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Sygate NAC and the Cisco NAC, respectfully, in a wired campus environment.  These 
solutions also allow the same functionality to be used for SSL VPN and IPSEC VPN 
connections. 
 
Figure 1. Symantec-owned Sygate Universal NAC flow diagram [11]. 
 
An important thing to note is that both solutions require system operators to install an 
agent on the client machine.  This agent communicates with software plug-ins that report 
the status of anti-virus, firewall, or host-based IDS software.  The agent then passes this 
information on to the policy server that makes a decision on client compliance.   
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Figure 2. Cisco NAC flow diagram [11]. 
 
2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Network Authentication Types 
2.3.1 802.1x 
 
The advantages and disadvantages within the 802.1x framework depend greatly on the 
EAP type being used.  Some EAP types are more robust or more vulnerable than others.  
Some, like TLS provide a high degree of security with two factor authentication.  
 
The major advantage of 802.1x authentication is the fact that only EAP traffic is allowed 
over switch ports until users transact a valid authentication.  This is important in locations 
where physical security is not completely controlled, since it prevents a perpetrator from 
connecting to the network by just having physical access. 
 
Another advantage that 802.1x offers, while using a secure EAP type like EAP-TLS, is 
that the client must be connected to a trusted authentication server.  This helps prevent a 
“rogue authentication server” from authenticating users and controlling their connection.  
The requirement is that both ends of the solution must authenticate to each other.  
Similarly, another advantage is that the switch can only communicate with predefined 
authentication servers, providing more security to the backend implementation. 
 
The 802.1x standard offers several different types of EAP and backend authentication 
types, such as RADIUS.  This allows for flexible implementation when installing 802.1x 
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in an existing network.  By using EAP-TLS with smart cards, a two factor authentication 
scheme can be implemented. 
 
A potential perpetrator could possibly set up a hub in between a true client and a switch.  
They could then watch the traffic and possibly spoof a MAC address and get into the 
network. 
 
The 802.1x standard details a fairly new network access methodology.  Devices such as 
printers do not fully conform to this methodology yet.  This could be a potential hazard 
because a switch port with a printer connected would then have to be left open (a non-
802.1x port), requiring it to be protected by other means, such as with physical security 
measures. 
2.3.2 Static Password 
 
“Passwords should be easy to remember but hard to figure out, guess or crack.1”  Many 
static passwords are poorly chosen, making them susceptible to dictionary attacks.  A big 
problem with static passwords is that they may be stolen or copied without the user being 
aware of the compromise.  A static password may be copied for future use by “sniffing” 
the network connection, if the password is sent unencrypted.  Even if it is sent encrypted, 
a replay attack may be useful, capturing the password off the network and replaying it at 
a future time to gain access. 
 
Well chosen static passwords may still be suitable for local authentication within a 
system.  For authentication to a network or to another system connected to a network, 
extreme care must be exercised when developing the authentication system, so to thwart 
replay attacks.  These could be mitigated by encrypting the password differently each 
time it is sent, but this starts to resemble a one time password system. 
2.3.3 One Time Passwords 
 
Advantages of one time password systems are that users cannot choose weak passwords 
and, if using two-factor authentication, only need to remember a PIN rather than a strong, 
potentially complicated, password.  Also, one time passwords are invalidated after their 
first use, therefore sniffed passwords are useless as soon as they are acquired from the 
network. 
 
The disadvantages of one time password systems based on two-factor authentication are 
that users need to physically have their token cards with them to authenticate, and that it 
takes longer to authenticate using one of these systems.  Two-factor systems may also 
require an additional server and could be expensive among large populations of users (by 
having to supply and manage many token cards).  Disadvantages of single factor one time 
password systems include distribution, protection, and synchronization of the 
prepopulated password lists. 
                                                          
1
 Essential System Administration [7], by Æleen Frisch, pg. 149. 
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2.3.4 Network Node Validation 
 
Network Node Validation products and solutions promise to enable enterprises to permit 
or deny network access based upon the identity of the user and/or machine as well as the 
security posture of the machine.  In addition these solutions permit quarantine and 
remediation capabilities for machines that don’t have current patch levels, have outdated 
anti-virus signature files, or have been infected with a virus or worm.  Detailed lab testing 
and usage experience will determine whether these solutions can feasibly be deployed in 
an enterprise environment. 
 
The disadvantage to these solutions is that they all require software agents and plug-ins to 
be installed on every host machine in order to provide the full functionality.  They also 
require interaction and cooperation between multiple computing areas such as desktop 
software, networking, security, and server administration. 
 
A specific disadvantage of the Cisco NAC solution is that it currently only works with 
Cisco hardware.  Cisco has apparently released the information on its NAC framework so 
that other vendors can use this as well.  Time will tell whether other vendors intend to 
implement the Cisco NAC solution in their network infrastructure hardware. 
2.4 Authentication Services 
2.4.1 RADIUS 
 
A RADIUS server is typically used in 802.1x authentication as the authentication server.  
There are several different RADIUS servers available for production.  Among them are 
Radiator, FreeRadius, and several others.  Sandia has a license for the Radiator product.  
Radiator provides modules for every type of EAP and several authentication types.  
Radiator works by defining an EAP type to communicate with the client.  Then, once a 
connection is established, Radiator will authenticate using several different options for 
validating the user’s credentials.  Among these is using a smart card with TLS, an NT 
domain, querying an LDAP database, local text database, and numerous other types. 
2.4.2 TACACS+ 
 
TACACS+, a Cisco proprietary protocol, offers centralized authentication services for a 
network [3].  Sandia’s Cisco network hardware uses TACACS+ to authenticate logins.  
The Cisco Secure ACS (Access Control Server) is the application used to provide 
TACACS+ authentication. 
 
2.4.3 Kerberos 
 
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol.  It is designed to provide strong 
authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key cryptography.  It allows 
users and services to authenticate themselves to each other.  That is, it allows them to 
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unequivocally demonstrate their identity to each other.  Kerberos was designed to 
eliminate the need to demonstrate possession of private or secret information (the 
password) by divulging the information itself. 
 
The Kerberos protocol uses strong cryptography so that a client can prove its identity to a 
server (and vice versa) across an insecure network.  Kerberos is based on the key 
distribution model developed by Needham and Schroeder [13].  A key is used to encrypt 
and decrypt short messages, and is itself typically a short sequence of bytes.  Keys 
provide the basis for the authentication in Kerberos. 
 
Roughly speaking, an encryption routine takes an encryption key and a plaintext 
message, and returns ciphertext.  Conversely, the decryption routine takes a decryption 
key and the ciphertext, and returns (if decryption is successful) the original plaintext.  In 
Kerberos, at the present time, the encryption key and the decryption key are identical.  
This is the hallmark of conventional cryptography, in which the keys are either identical 
or at least easily derivable from one another.  In fact, in many realizations, either key can 
be used for encryption, and the other key for decryption. In contrast, in public key 
cryptography, there are two keys, one for encryption, one for decryption, which are not 
derivable from one another. 
 
Kerberos is typically used when a user on a network is attempting to make use of a 
network service, and the service wants assurance that the user is who he says he is.  To 
that end, the user presents a ticket that is issued by the Kerberos authentication server 
(AS).  The service then examines the ticket to verify the identity of the user.  If all checks 
out, then the user is accepted.  Therefore, this ticket must contain information linking it 
explicitly to the user.  The ticket must demonstrate that the bearer knows something only 
its intended user would know, such as a password.  Furthermore, there must be 
safeguards against an attacker stealing the ticket, and using it later. 
 
Both the user and the service are required to have keys registered with the AS.  The user's 
key is derived from a password that he chooses; the service key is a randomly selected 
key. 
 
For the purposes of this explanation, let us imagine that messages are written on paper 
(instead of being electronic), and are ‘encrypted’ by being locked in a strongbox by 
means of a key.  In this ‘box world,’ principals are initialized by making a physical key 
and registering a copy of the key with the AS. 
 
1. First the user sends a message to the AS: “Alice the User, would like to talk to Bob 
the Server.” 
2. When the AS receives this message, it makes up two copies of a brand new key.  
This is called the session key that is used in the direct exchange between user and 
service. 
3. The AS puts one of the session keys in Box 1, along with a piece of paper with the 
name “Bob the Server” written on it.  It locks this box with the user's key.  The AS 
includes the paper since, if Box 1 only contained the session key, then the user 
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wouldn't be able to tell whether the response came back from the AS, or whether 
the decryption was successful.  By putting in “Bob the Server,” the user will be able 
to verify both that the box comes from the AS, and that the decryption was 
successful. 
4. The AS puts the other session key in a Box 2, along with a piece of paper with the 
name “Alice the User” written on it.  It locks this box with the service's key. 
5. The AS returns both boxes to the user. 
6. The user unlocks Box 1 with his key, extracting the session key and the paper with 
“Bob the Server” written on it. 
7. The user can't open Box 2 since it's locked with the service's key.  Instead, he puts a 
piece of paper with the current time written on it in Box 3, and locks it with the 
session key.  He then hands both boxes (Box 2 and Box 3) to the service. 
8. The service opens Box 2 with its own key, extracting the session key and the paper 
with “Alice the User” written on it.  It then opens Box 3 with the session key to 
extract the piece of paper with the current time on it.  These items demonstrate the 
identity of the user. 
 
The timestamp is put in Box 3 to prevent someone else from copying Box 2 (remember, 
these are simply electronic messages) and using it to impersonate the user at a later time. 
Because clocks don't always work in perfect synchrony, a small amount of leeway (about 
five minutes is typical) is given between the timestamp and the current time.  In addition, 
the service maintains a list of recently sent authenticators, to make sure that they aren't 
resent in quick order. 
 
To open Box 2, the service uses a randomly generated key that is stored in a special file 
call a service key file.  This file is assumed to be secure, so that no one can copy the file 
and impersonate the service to a legitimate user.  In Kerberos terminology, Box 2 is 
called the ticket, and Box 3 is called the authenticator.  The authenticator typically 
contains more information than what is listed here.  Some of this added information 
arises from the fact that this is an electronic message (for example, there is a checksum).  
There may also be an encryption key in the authenticator to provide for privacy in future 
communications between the user and the service. 
 
There is a subtle problem with the above exchange.  It is used every time a user wants to 
contact a service.  But then he has to enter in a password to unlock Box 1 with the key 
each time.  The obvious way around this is to cache the key derived from the password. 
However, caching the key is dangerous.  With a copy of this key, an attacker could 
impersonate the user at any time until the password is next changed. 
 
Kerberos resolves this issue by introducing a new agent, called the Ticket Granting 
Server (TGS).  The TGS is logically distinct from the AS, although they may reside on 
the same physical machine.  They are often referred to collectively as the KDC -- the Key 
Distribution Center, from Needham and Schroeder [13].  The function of the TGS is as 
follows.  Before accessing any regular service, the user requests a ticket to contact the 
TGS, just as if it were any other service.  This ticket is called the ticket granting ticket 
(TGT). 
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After receiving the TGT, any time that the user wishes to contact a service, he requests a 
ticket not from the AS, but from the TGS.  Furthermore, the reply is encrypted not with 
the user's secret key, but with the session key that the AS provided for use with the TGS.  
Inside that reply is the new session key for use with the regular service.  The rest of the 
exchange now continues as described above. 
 
The advantage this provides is that while passwords usually remain valid for months at a 
time, the TGT is good only for a fairly short period, typically eight hours.  Afterwards, 
the TGT is not usable by anyone, including the user or any attacker.  This TGT, as well 
as any tickets that you obtain using it, are stored in the credentials cache. 
2.4.4 LDAP 
 
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a networking protocol for 
querying and modifying directory services running over TCP/IP.  An LDAP directory 
follows the X.500 model:  It is a tree of entries, each of which consists of a set of named 
attributes with values.  An LDAP directory typically reflects political, geographic, and/or 
organizational boundaries.  LDAP deployments today tend to use Domain Name System 
(DNS) names for structuring the top levels of the hierarchy.  Further below might appear 
entries representing people, organizational units, printers, documents, or anything else. 
 
LDAP is not limited to contact information, or even information about people.  LDAP 
can be used to look up encryption certificates, pointers to printers and other services on a 
network, and provide ‘single sign-on’ where one password for a user is shared between 
many services.  LDAP is appropriate for any kind of directory-like information, where 
fast lookups and less-frequent updates are the norm.  In short LDAP provides the frame 
work for establishing a distributed database and allows for the distributed management 
and update of data. 
 
LDAP is not specifically designed as an authentication service, but rather is a distributed 
database.  In some instances it may useful to store information that could be useful in 
determining authentication characteristics and options for client/server inter-operations. 
2.4.5 NT Domain 
 
Microsoft Windows NT Domains are logical groupings of workstation and user accounts 
with central administrative control, security, and authorization.  While often still referred 
to as “NT Domain”, it has evolved into “Active Directory”, which is basically the same 
concept, but built on a different structure with significantly advanced features. 
 
NT Domain authentication utilizes a database of usernames and passwords for 
authenticating users.  The Active Directory implementation uses an LDAP-compatible 
(but not LDAP-compliant) directory database. 
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Domain controllers use the information in the directory database to authenticate users 
logging on to domain accounts. 
 
Non-Windows entities can use an NT Domain for authenticating users, provided the 
entity speaks the correct protocols.  For example, a RADIUS server can utilize an NT 
Domain or Active Directory to authenticate a user that is attempting access from a dial-
up, VPN, or wireless system. 
2.5 Equipment Survey 
2.5.1 Switches and Operating Software 
 
The 802.1x standard is now supported by the current IOS version of both Cisco and 
Foundry.  This covers all of the switches including the entire Foundry FastIron Edge 
Series, and Cisco switches 2900 and more advanced. 
2.5.2 Operating Systems and Clients 
 
The following chart (Table 1) lists operating systems and clients that provide 802.1x 
support.  It also lists the supported EAP types.  This chart can be found at 
http://www.open.com.au/radiator/technical.html#wireless. 
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Table 1. Client support for 802.1x. 
 
OS  Client EAP-Types Supported 
Linux, Open 
BSD 
Xsupplicant 
MD5, TLS, TTLS, (PAP, CHAP, 
MSCHAP, MSCHAPV2), PEAP 
(MSCHAPV2), EAP-SIM 
Linux MDC Aegis 
MD5, TLS, TTLS, LEAP, PEAP 
(MSCHAPV2) 
Windows Window XP TLS, PEAP (MSCHAPV2, TLS) 
  
Windows 2000 TLS, PEAP (MSCHAPV2, TLS) 
  
MDC Aegis 
MD5, TLS, TTLS (PAP, CHAP, 
MSCHAP, MSCHAPV2, EAP-MD5), 
PEAP (MSCHAPV2, EAP-TLS, EAP-
Generic-Token), LEAP, EAP-SIM (with 
Radiator add-on EAP-SIM support 
package) 
  
Alfa+Ariss Secure W2 TTLS-PAP 
  
Cisco LEAP, PEAP, EAP-SIM (with Radiator 
add-on EAP-SIM support package) 
  
Odyssey Client 
MD5, TTLS (PAP, CHAP, MSCHAP, 
MSCHAPV2), EAP-Generic-Token, TLS, 
PEAP (MSCHAPV2, EAP-Generic-
Token), LEAP 
  
Boingo  TLS, PEAP (MSCHAPV2, TLS) 
Pocket PC PocketPC 2003 Native TLS, PEAP (MSCHAPV2, TLS) 
  
Alfa+Ariss Secure W2 TTLS-PAP 
Mac OSX 
Xsupplicant 
MD5, TLS, TTLS (PAP, CHAP, 
MSCHAP, MSCHAPV2), PEAP 
(MSCHAPV2), EAP-SIM 
  
Panther Native 
MD5, TLS, TTLS (PAP, CHAP, 
MSCHAP, MSCHAPV2), PEAP 
(MSCHAPV2), LEAP 
  
MDC Aegis MD5, TLS, TTLS, LEAP, PEAP 
 
2.5.3 EAP Types 
 
There are several different types of authentication.  
 
• LEAP 
o Proprietary implementation by Cisco 
o Provides mutual authentication 
o Provides frequent authentication and on the wireless side upon every new 
authentication a client receives a new WEP key 
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• EAP-TLS 
o Provides mutual authentication 
o Uses PKI infrastructure 
o Requires client side and server side certificates 
o By using a smart card, TLS allows for two factor authentication, both the 
client and the smart card are authenticated 
• EAP-MD5 
o User name and password only for authentication 
o Turns the password into a hash 
o Vulnerable to dictionary attacks 
• EAP-TTLS 
o Two stage authentication 
o In first stage the RADIUS server is authenticated to the client creating a 
TLS tunnel 
o In the second stage the user’s credentials are passed to the RADIUS server 
as attribute value pairs  
• PEAP 
o Works much in the same way as TTLS 
o Uses server-side certificates only 
o In addition to the first session created in a TLS tunnel, it performs 
authentication in a second tunnel 
 
Each of these offers a different scheme with advantages and disadvantages.  The most 
secure method is TLS because of its mutual authentication and the fact that it allows for 
two factor authentication.  The downside to TLS is that there is a lot of overhead when 
configuring devices with certificates.  
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3  Network Node Validation and Remediation 
 
Members of this project examined, to varying degrees, network node validation and 
remediation product offerings from Cisco, ConSentry, Symantec-Sygate, and Vernier.  
We acquired loaner equipment from ConSentry for more detailed evaluation. 
 
The equipment from ConSentry consisted of a management unit (using a Windows 2003 
Server operating system) designed to manage multiple ConSentry LANShield switches 
and LANShield controllers, and a LANShield CS2400 controller.  The CS2400 has 10 
pairs of ports supporting small form factor GBICs.  The LANShield controller would 
normally sit between a distribution layer switch and an access layer switch.  In our lab, 
the CS2400 was wired up such that one port of the pair (uplink) was connected to a 
Foundry FastIron 2402 (representing the distribution layer switch) and the other port of 
the pair (downlink) was connected to a 3Com SuperStack 3 Switch 4400 (representing 
the access layer or edge switch), as shown in Figure 3.  A laptop computer, representing a 
portable client, was plugged into the 3Com switch.  On some occasions, the laptop was 
plugged directly into the downlink port of the CS2400, thereby causing the LANShield  
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VMWare Windows XP 
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Unit
Active Directory 
(VMWare on 
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Figure 3. Testbed for ConSentry equipment. 
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controller to act like an edge switch.  Both configurations functioned identically for our 
tests. 
 
The ConSentry controller enforces policy-based authorization for users’ access to 
services for which they have authorization.  The controller enforces authorized user 
access by the use of Roles and Policies.  The system associates each user with a Role, and 
each Role has one or more Policies.  A Policy is a definition statement that either allows 
or disallows a particular activity.  For instance, it may allow connections to a certain IP 
address or allow access to a specified application protocol.  Roles specify broad 
categories of use, and they might include policy groups’ activities such network 
administration, security teams, and typical users.  Roles can and do provide authenticated 
users with varying levels of network, program, and data access. 
 
We created a variety of users with different roles and different policies as to what actions 
users with that role could perform.  These users were in a test domain that we established 
on an LDAP server.  For these tests the LDAP server was running on a VMWare virtual 
machine executing on the ConSentry management unit.  We also created a non-domain 
user, representative of Linux, Macintosh, or local Windows users.  So we could test out 
cases where two clients were logged in and accessing the network at approximately the 
same time, we created a VMWare client system on the ConSentry management box and 
connected that virtual system into the 3Com (access layer) switch. 
 
When the ConSentry equipment functioned properly, it worked well, assigning the role 
correctly to the various domain users and restricting or permitting network actions as 
specified.  When the local, non-domain user logged in and tried to access the network, the 
ConSentry controller blocked his access, which is the desired action, since he is 
unauthenticated. 
 
There is a captive portal feature on the ConSentry equipment to capture the non-domain 
users when they try to access the network through a browser and force them to 
authenticate before granting them network access.  If a non-domain user attempts to 
perform a network access (SSH or telnet for example), he will be denied by the 
ConSentry because he is unauthenticated.  That user must initiate a web browser, which 
upon any access will redirect the user to the captive portal on the ConSentry management 
box.  The captive portal will prompt the user for his authentication credentials (e.g. 
username and password), and attempt to authenticate him.  If the authentication is 
successful, the proper role is assigned to the user and appropriate access is permitted.  
The user can then return to his command window or screen and perform his SSH, telnet, 
or whatever network function he was trying to perform, providing of course, that the 
policies for his role permit the attempted function.  If the authentication failed over 
several attempts, the user remains blocked from accessing the network. 
 
While we saw the captive portal feature work once under a specific set of circumstances 
when the ConSentry systems engineer was installing and configuring the equipment, we 
have not been able to make the captive portal operate in our environment.  (The browsers 
seem to need a proxy configuration file, which they are blocked by the ConSentry from 
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accessing.  It appears that without the proper proxy configuration, the browser is never 
executing the captive portal code.) 
 
At times, the ConSentry equipment would go into a state where it would block all access 
by everyone, even valid accounts.  It appeared to block all traffic, including traffic to the 
LDAP server, so the Windows domain users could still log in using cashed Windows 
domain credentials, but have no network access.  This condition would sometimes persist 
through a reload/reboot of the ConSentry controller/switch.  This event occurred 
numerous times, but was not necessarily repeatable. 
 
At first, it seemed that if there were no validated users on the system and a non-domain 
user logged in locally to the laptop connected to the network, then all subsequent network 
access from that laptop was blocked and remained blocked, even when a Windows 
domain user logged in from said laptop.  (The ConSentry equipment did not seem to 
validate the domain user against the LDAP credentials, hence the user would be 
authenticated based upon previously cashed credentials.)  We cleared this condition by 
reloading/rebooting the ConSentry controller/switch.  Eventually we found that we could 
not consistently repeat this end result by repeating the same scenario.  Also, we could not 
consistently clear this problem by rebooting/reloading the ConSentry controller/switch. 
 
The ConSentry equipment has the ability to perform host remediation, or “host posture 
checking” in their terminology.  We did not exercise this feature of the ConSentry 
equipment because it relies on a third party software client (“dissolvable agent”), 
supplied by a company on the DOE sensitive countries list.  ConSentry has plans to 
replace this third party agent with one supplied from a company in an accepted country, 
although this did not occur in time for our tests. 
 
The currently supplied ConSentry dissolvable agent is an Active X or Java applet that 
performs a compliance check on the host.  It checks for compliant Windows Service 
Packs and Hotfix versions, and spyware detection, adware detection, and anti-virus 
software [14].  As stated above, we did not verify these claims. 
 
The ConSentry controller predicates its protection model on authenticating users and then 
allowing the user to access resources for which they have authorization.  This is, in 
essence, a client to server model where there is a person at the client device that can 
perform a network login.  This model does not work in all cases. Many network-attached 
devices function autonomously.  For example, a network attached printer functions on the 
behalf of many users, yet there is no authorized user at the printer to activate the network 
login.  Other network devices, such as IP telephones, may not be able to support a 
network login, yet they still require network access.  In situations where the ConSentry 
protection model is not appropriate, Sandia would need to devise network connection 
policies to support equipment such as printers and IP telephones.  In testing the 
ConSentry controller, we found no way to allow a printer network access without 
disabling the network protection mechanisms.  Any deployment of network protection 
equipment such as the ConSentry will need to address the policies and practices for 
controlling atypical or autonomous network devices. 
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We were not able to test how the ConSentry equipment handles non-interactive logins or 
multiple user logins from the same system.  This can occur in several scenarios.  Multiple 
users can log in to a Linux desktop, each performing network transactions.  Although 
Fast User Switching is not available on Windows XP Professional-based computers that 
are part of a domain network, a local XP user may have authenticated through the 
ConSentry via its captive portal feature and now a different local user might log in 
through the Microsoft Fast User Switching feature.  A user with a large or long running, 
but lower priority program may distribute it across a “virtual cluster” of systems, 
absorbing the unused compute cycles available in off hour (out-of-normal-workday) 
times that the machines would otherwise sit idle.  Depending on where the ConSentry 
devices are placed in the network, and the scope or “breadth” of the virtual cluster, the 
ConSentry equipment could impact the operation of the virtual cluster.  In these cases it is 
not clear that the ConSentry devices would work at all, and if so whether they would 
perform properly.  Several questions come to mind: 
o Would each user be forced into the role (be it more or less restrictive) of the first 
user to log in? 
o Would the role be assigned based on the latest user to log in, thereby changing the 
set of permitted actions for the previously logged in users? 
o How would ssh processes spawned for distributed or virtual cluster computing, 
authenticate? 
o If we were using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, how would they 
authenticate and get their role assigned? 
 
In summary, the ConSentry equipment we tested seemed to be able to perform role 
assignment and restricting or permitting network actions based upon that role in the case 
of one interactive user on a machine at a time.  However, multiple concurrent users on a 
machine; non-interactive users, processes, and devices; and distributed or virtual cluster 
processing are all likely to be problematic.  The stability and reliability of the equipment 
is questionable.  At this time, it does not seem stable and consistent enough for enterprise 
use, especially in a network with mixed Windows domain users, local Windows users, 
Macintosh users, and UNIX/Linux users. 
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4 Network Authentication Pilot Using 802.1x 
 
Under the Network Authentication Investigation project, Sandia implemented a small 
pilot using IEEE 802.1x to control network port access. 
4.1 802.1x Operating Details 
 
802.1x is an IEEE standard, and when in use, forces users to be authenticated to a 
network at the switch port before full network access is allowed.  Within the 802.1x 
authentication framework there are three main parts: client, network access server (NAS, 
which is a switch), and a Radius server.  In 802.1x terminology the client is called the 
supplicant, the switch is called the authenticator, and the RADIUS server is called the 
authenticating server.  To understand 802.1x, one must understand each of these 
components and how they can be configured individually, as well as how they 
communicate to perform an authentication.  
The supplicant is an application running on the end user's operating system that, in basic 
terms, takes the user's credentials, and requests access to the network.  It then sends the 
user's credentials to the NAS when asked for the credentials.  
The NAS controls the physical port and forwards the authenticating information to the 
Radius server.  If the Radius server accepts or authorizes the user then the switch turns 
“on” the switch port and the user has access to the remainder of the network.  
The Radius server performs the validation of the user's credentials to see if the user is 
permitted to access the network. 
 
802.1x controls access to the network by electronically shutting down all of the switch 
ports to which the end users are connected.  Then it turns “on” each port individually, 
based on a per user authentication.  The port can be in one of two states at all times when 
802.1x is enabled for that port:  on or off.  To be “on” means that the Radius server has 
validated the user and has granted access to the network.  If the port is “off” the user 
cannot send any traffic over to the network except for the authentication protocol.  That 
protocol is called Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), and is used by the 802.1x 
framework to pass the authentication information to each of the main components.  A 
successful authentication occurs by the supplicant sending a message to the switch to 
start an authentication session.  Then a series of access requests are followed by passing 
the client credentials to the Radius server for validation.  Figure 4 shows how the 
exchange of packets occurs for a successful authentication. 
 
EAP allows for several different forms of authentication. These include sending user 
name and password in clear text, in special hashes, and by using certificates.  The 
availability of these authentication types depends on the three components of the system 
and their capabilities. 
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Figure 4. 802.1x authentication session. 
 
4.2 Sandia Requirements and Goals 
 
This pilot needed to permit authentication with the following two forms of credentials.  
o Smart Card: an ID card that forces the users to type a password into a software 
application to gain access to the card.  The card contains Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) certificates issued by a trusted Certificate Authority.  In the 802.1x system 
this becomes the client's credentials that allow the user access to the network.  
o CryptoCard: a token card that forces users to enter a personal identification 
number (PIN) into it to get a randomly generated password associated with the 
user’s name.  The password is also generated on a Crypto Card server that has a 
list of possible passwords for the user to use to authenticate to the system. 
 
This requirement would become the driver for the entire pilot.  It is important here to 
define a term that will be used throughout the rest of this chapter. 
o Fully Capable System: is a system with the ability to perform both Smart Card 
and CryptoCard authentication for each operating system (Windows, Macintosh, 
and Linux) considered. 
 
When considering how to accomplish smart card and CryptoCard authentication, the first 
objective was to research and decide which EAP type to use.  The need for smart card 
and CryptoCard drove this decision because EAP defines what type of credentials will be 
valid for the user.  The choices were: 
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o For Smart Card: EAP-TLS; 
o For Crypto Card: EAP-PEAP-GTC and EAP-TTLS. 
 
The following is a list of the goals created for the pilot. 
o Provide at least one form of authentication for each of the operating systems; 
o Find problems and inadequacies in the 802.1x system; 
o Set up a test lab; 
o Set up an operational pilot. 
 
4.3 Supplicant 
 
The supplicant, as stated before, is an application running on the user's operating system, 
which passes the clients credentials to the switch for authentication.  Configuration of the 
supplicant is the simplest part of the overall 802.1x development process.  Although it is 
the simplest part of the process it is also the most limiting factor of a fully capable 802.1x 
system. 
4.3.1 Requirements 
 
The first requirement is that to perform smart card authentication you must have an 
additional piece of software and hardware.  This piece of hardware is called a smart card 
reader and is the physical device into which the smart card is inserted.  The software 
needed is the drivers for the reader, which are necessary to extract the credentials from 
the smart card.  This is one of the biggest problems in setting up a fully capable 802.1x 
system, and will be discussed further in a later section.  In addition to needing the smart 
card reader, the supplicant must also provide support for TLS authentication. 
 
To perform crypto card authentication the supplicant had to provide support for either 
EAP-PEAP-GTC or EAP-TTLS. 
4.3.2 Client Setup 
 
Several supplicants were set up on each of the operating systems that we wanted to 
support.  In general most of the supplicants behave very similar.  To configure a 
supplicant you use drop down menus (or something similar) to decide the type of EAP 
that you wish to use.  Then you enter your user name and password at prompts to perform 
the authentication.  There are a few nuances that are specific to each supplicant will be 
described in the following sections. 
4.3.2.1 Windows 
4.3.2.1.1 Windows Native 
 
The Windows native supplicant is enabled by default on Windows XP.  To configure the 
supplicant, go into the properties box (shown in Figure 5) for the Ethernet card and then 
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click the authentication tab.  At the authentication tab, define the specific EAP type 
desired and then click OK.  A downside to the windows native supplicant is that it only 
supports three EAP types, none of which are capable of supporting the CryptoCard. 
 
 
Figure 5. Windows client configuration. 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Odyssey Access Client  
 
This supplicant has numerous capabilities, and is a much better supplicant than Windows 
Native.  It offers support for several EAP types including those needed for smart card and 
CryptoCard authentication.  The configuration is a little different than Windows, but 
generally the same.  The application has to be run like any other third party application, 
but it is simple to configure, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Odyssey client configuration. 
 
4.3.2.2 Macintosh 
4.3.2.2.1 MAC Native 
 
This is a very capable supplicant and it behaves the same as the others do in terms of 
configuration.  It is an application that you must run to configure like the Odyssey Client, 
but matches Odyssey in capabilities.  It offers support for several types of EAP including 
support for smart cards and CryptoCard. 
4.3.2.3 Linux  
4.3.2.3.1 Meetinghouse Client 
 
The Meetinghouses client behaves and is configured in much the same way as the 
previously mentioned supplicants.  It has support for a wide range of EAP types.  A small 
drawback is that it only works on the new Red Hat versions.  A notable difference in this 
supplicant is that one must statically enter a password for the CyptoCard authentication.  
This is different from the Windows and Macintosh supplicants that prompt for user 
information.  Having to generate a password with the CryptoCard, enter it into the static 
configuration, and then authenticate, may be an awkward procedure that limits user 
acceptance. 
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4.3.2.3.2 Xsupplicant 
 
This supplicant is the only one that has a different form of configuration.  To configure 
Xsupplicant you must modify configuration files with the correct parameters to perform 
the authentication.  A GUI is available that is supposed to work with several different 
Linux distributions, but we were not able to make it function properly during this project. 
4.3.3 Client Problems 
 
When looking at a fully capable 802.1x system, the client is the most limiting factor.  
This is not just based on the client support for different EAP types, but includes the 
availability of smart card readers and drivers for the various systems. 
 
Linux and Macintosh do not have support for the smart cards in use at Sandia.  This is a 
problem because without the reader, the supplicant cannot get the users credentials. 
Without the users credentials no successful authentication can take place.  The 
supplicants on Linux and Mac do support smart card authentication, but the lack of smart 
card reader support denies the ability to perform the authentication.  This limitation 
forces the use of CryptoCards with these systems. 
 
The Windows native supplicant does not support any EAP type that allows CryptoCard 
authentication.  The alternative, Odyssey Client, does support the correct EAP types, but 
requires technical support for the third party application. 
 
Xsupplicant is not a viable supplicant because of slow performance.  During testing, the 
fastest authentication took four minutes.  Additionally, it only performed two successful 
authentications among several attempts.  If Xsupplicant was consistent in authentication 
it might be a possible solution, but the inability to work correctly coupled with the long 
wait time for authentication makes this option not viable. 
 
The following chart displays the supplicant as well as the operating system's ability to 
perform smart card and CryptoCard authentication.  As can be seen in Table 2, this is a 
limiting factor to implementing the fully capable system described earlier. 
 
Table 2. Supplicant support for two factor authentication. 
 
Client Smart Card Support CryptoCard Support 
Windows Native Yes No 
Odyssey Client Yes Yes 
Mac OS No Yes 
Xsupplicant No Yes 
Meetinghouse Client No Yes 
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4.4 Switch 
4.4.1 Technology Review And Decisions 
 
The requirements for the switches were fairly simple in regard to their technical 
specifications.  They had to support 802.1x authentication.  An additional specification 
was that the switches in the testbed needed to be representative of what Sandia has in its 
existing environment.  A Cisco 3750 and a Foundry FES 2402 Prem were purchased to 
do the work.  Several non-802.1x-capable commodity switches were obtained for 
multiple host environment (see Section 4.4.3) and other advanced testing. 
4.4.2 Configuration 
 
The configuration of both switches was straightforward.  It took roughly ten commands 
to get one port enabled for 802.1x, with about thirty extra seconds per port on one switch. 
A list of the commands, for each switch, can be found in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3. 802.1x configuration commands for Cisco switch. 
 
Switch# configure terminal 
Switch(config)# aaa new-model 
Switch(config)# aaa authentication dot1x default group radius 
Switch(config)# dot1x system-auth-control 
Switch(config)# radius-server host 192.168.1.1 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 key MySecreT 
Switch(config)# interface g1/0/1 
Switch(config-if)# switchport mode access 
Switch(config-if)# switchport access vlan 1 
Switch(config-if)# dot1x port-control auto 
Switch(config-if)# end 
 
Table 4. 802.1x configuration commands for Foundry switch. 
 
switch(config)# aaa authentication dot1x default radius 
switch(config)# radius-server host 192.168.1.1 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 default key 
MyKeY dot1x 
switch(config)# dot1x-enable 
switch(config-dot1x)# enable ethernet 13 to 24 
switch(config-dot1x)# exit 
switch(config)# interface e 13 
switch(config-if-13)# dot1x port-control auto 
(Apply the last two commands for all interfaces that are to be 802.1x interfaces) 
 
The Cisco switch worked correctly right away with no difficulties.  The Foundry switch 
proved to be a little bit more difficult to set up because the Foundry code version was out 
of date and it needed to be upgraded.  Once the newer code version was loaded on the 
Foundry, it worked fine. 
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4.4.3 Multi-Host Problem 
 
The main concern pertaining to the switches is their ability to support a multiple host 
environment.  A multiple host environment occurs when there is a switch port enabled 
with 802.1x authentication, and a user connects an office switch (without 802.1x enabled) 
to that port because they want to use several computers on the one Internet connection.  
The problem lies in how the authentication will occur through a switch that is not 802.1x 
enabled, and if a user will be allowed to access the network at all.  The problem is 
illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Multiple host environment. 
 
Foundry's newer code version supports the ability to force authentication of each host, 
which is what is needed for the 802.1x system.  The Cisco does not allow the same 
capability.  The Cisco switch forces one of the hosts to authenticate and once that occurs, 
it allows any other users plugged into the office switch access to the network.  Another 
problem is that if the office switch is “too smart” it will not forward the 802.1x packets 
correctly.  So, the office switch must be a dumb switch to allow the proper functionality, 
even with the Foundry switch as the 802.1x enabled switch in the configuration. 
4.5 RADIUS  
 
The Radius server was the most complicated and time consuming part of establishing the 
pilot.  As stated before it is the component of the system that validates the users’ 
credentials.  It can do this in numerous ways, depending on the specific server that is 
chosen.  When looking at the Radius servers it was important to keep in mind the concept 
of a fully capable system.  To have the fully capable system, the Radius server had to 
support both smart cards and CryptoCards.  Radius servers are able to perform several 
different types of authentication by default.  They differ in their individual 
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implementations, but most support the necessary types of authentication for smart card 
and CryptoCard authentication. 
4.5.1 Technology Review And Decisions  
 
There are several different Radius servers available.  When looking at Radius servers, we 
found that Sandia had a site license for Radiator, a specific Radius server.  After 
configuring Radiator, some time was also spent configuring Free Radius, another Radius 
server that is free software anyone can use.  Free Radius was also configured because it 
appeared to perform some specific aspects of the CryptoCard authentication better than 
Radiator.  Experience was gained in configuring both Radius servers, but Radiator was 
chosen because the configuration for CryptoCard authentication was accomplished on 
Radiator before Free Radius, allowing us to work on other aspects of the pilot. 
4.5.2 Smart Card Authentication Setup 
 
Smart card authentication uses EAP-TLS, as stated earlier.  To get TLS working one 
must point attributes within the Radiator configuration file to necessary certificate files 
for validation of the users’ credentials.  Understanding how certificates are validated is 
out of the scope of this document. 
 
Setting up the Radiator configuration file was trivial, but getting the authentication to 
work was difficult because of the nature of certificates.  Certificates are very specific in 
how they are set up.  If one piece of the configuration is not exactly where it should be, 
the certificates will not work.  Although Radiator was set up quickly, it took much time 
and effort to get the certificates working properly.  After the certificate system was 
working, half of the fully capable system (in terms of Radius configuration) was set up. 
4.5.3 Crypto Card Authentication Setup 
 
The crypto card setup was the most time consuming and toughest part of the system to 
configure properly.  The CryptoCard had to authenticate through the Radius server to the 
crypto card server.  This was not an easy task, because the crypto card server does not 
have any easy way for the authenticator to connect to it, without custom code.  The EAP 
types chosen for the crypto card authentication were EAP-PEAP-GTC and EAP-TTLS.  
 
Sandia has a Free Radius server in existence that already connects to the crypto card 
server.  During configuration it was discovered that the Free Radius code was too 
customized to recreate on our testbed servers in a time frame acceptable for the pilot.  For 
the pilot, the users’ credentials were authenticated through Radiator to an LDAP server 
that performed its authentication against the CryptoCard server.  The back end portion of 
the Radius configuration was complete and we had a fully capable system, in terms of the 
Radius component. 
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4.6 Setting up 802.1x for New Users 
 
Setting up the 802.1x system for new users is an easy task.  The authentication server is 
already deployed and operating.  To set up individual users, the following steps are 
performed. 
o Find the port on the edge switch into which the user is connected; 
o If the switch does not have 802.1x enabled on it already, issue the commands to 
turn it on and then define the correct Radius server to use (this takes roughly 4 
commands); 
o Apply 802.1x authentication to the port into which the user is connected; 
o Set the port to 802.1x auto mode; 
o Configure the users’ supplicant for 802.1x. 
 
Turning on 802.1x after finding the switch and port into which the user is connected, 
takes between five to ten minutes. 
4.7 Pilot Status 
 
The pilot is currently deployed to four users, and has been in this state since July 24, 
2006.  From its creation the pilot has seen stability and success with only a few problems 
occurring, which will be discussed in a later section.  Although the pilot has been running 
consistently, it is still not deployed to an ample enough user base to get a true 
understanding of how the 802.1x system would work on a larger scale. 
 
Upon starting the pilot there were some questions on the ability of 802.1x to allow for a 
multiple host environment (section 4.4.3).  This issue has been worked out for the 
Foundry switch and the multiple host environment has worked as it should.  How Cisco 
handles this environment, is still an open problem. 
 
Other positive results include the ease of use of the clients and the ability to stay logged 
into the 802.1x system while having a locked workstation. 
4.8 Problems & Solutions 
 
The following specific problems have occurred: 
o Problem: When attempting to authenticate with a smart card, a user will not be 
able to authenticate. 
o Solution: The log files on the Radius server showed that the problem with 
the authentication attempt was that the client/supplicant was not getting 
the certificate off of the smart card.  The problem has no apparent fix 
besides logging off of windows and logging back on.  It appears as though 
there is a bug in either the client/supplicant or the smart card reading 
software, which impedes the opportunity to fix the problem.  With it only 
happening once it seems as though there may have been unseen 
circumstances that might have affected the authentication attempt, and 
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unless the issue recurs on a larger scale, it should pose no threat to the 
capability of the 802.1x system. 
 
o Problem: The back end for a crypto card authentication failed once, and rejected 
the authentication attempt. 
o Solution: The problem lies somewhere with the user's credentials and the 
LDAP server.  It was not a fault of the 802.1x system but rather of that 
specific user and the crypto card authentication server.  Attempts were 
made by different users at around the same time and their credentials were 
validated. 
 
o Problem: Sandia Macintosh computers are set up to first authenticate against the 
Kerberos server before logging into the computer.  For 802.1x to work properly 
the user must first login locally to their machine and then they are able to 
authenticate to the 802.1x system.  The problem is that when a network is present 
the Kerberos settings on the Mac do not allow for the user to log in locally first, 
hence, denying them the ability to login into the network at all. 
o This is a problem with the default login settings for the Sandia Macs 
because they require Kerberos authentication first, and will only allow a 
local login if there is no network cable plugged into the computer.  A 
solution has yet to be found for allowing a local login before the network 
login.  A possible solution is changing the settings in the /etc/authorization 
file to allow for this, but that has not yet been accomplished. 
 
There remain problems inherent to 802.1x, such as uniform client support for the 
commonly used operating systems at Sandia, and the manner in which Cisco handles a 
multiple host environment. 
 
Another problem is overall support for 802.1x authentication in devices such as printers, 
palm pilots, VoIP phones, etc.  These were not addressed in this pilot. 
4.9 Pilot Conclusions and Path Forward 
 
An IEEE 802.1x authentication framework has been established that allowed for one 
form of authentication on each of the main operating systems under consideration.  
Problem areas were located (and to some extent, remedied) within the current state of an 
802.1x system.  A pilot was initiated and used for several months. 
 
The pilot explored, and in most cases got much better performance from third party 
software applications.  This takes away the myth that to have a fully capable 802.1x 
system you must use all Cisco or all Microsoft products.  By being able to use the other 
pieces you can have more options and are not tied to one vendor to supply each 
component of the system. 
 
The pilot is currently deployed to a small user base.  The 802.1x framework in its current 
state cannot provide a fully capable system, but it is in a state that could be implemented 
35 
to provide a greater level of security to Sandia networks.  The pilot did not collect 
statistics to measure the effects, if any, of 802.1x on switch throughput and network 
performance. 
 
A possible path forward is to extend the reach of the pilot and set up 802.1x 
authentication for more users.  This will enable the Network Authentication team to more 
accurately assess the outcomes of a more extensive pilot, and discover how 802.1x will 
function on a larger scale.  This would also provide an opportunity to continue exploring 
and investigating the problems with 802.1x and researching possible solutions. 
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5 Recommended Strategy for Network Authentication at Sandia 
 
Sandia’s business operation increasingly relies on information technology and data stored 
electronically.  However, that technology and data are under constant threat of attack.  
Perpetrators are getting faster at introducing new network attacks, and the attacks 
themselves are more frequent.  Therefore, detection and containment at the edge of the 
network is vital.  With more emphasis on technology, constantly increasing threats, and 
declining budgets, Sandia needs a cost-effective way to protect their network resources.  
Network authentication provides a level of protection. 
 
Any network authentication technology should increase the security of our networks and 
increase user accountability.  It should be a component of a larger data security posture 
that coordinates with future planning and road mapping efforts.  Preferably it should 
incorporate some sort of two-factor authentication, be convenient, be easy to maintain 
and support, be reliable, be inexpensive, and work across platforms for both office and 
mobile use.  It must be manageable and scaleable. 
 
There are five technology functions that are accepted and expected as part of a Network 
Authentication and Control (NAC) product [2], although these five functions are only 
vaguely defined.  They are: 
o Pre-connect host posture assessment; 
o Host quarantine and remediation; 
o Network access control based on user identity; 
o Network resource control based on identity and policy; 
o Ongoing threat analysis and containment. 
 
Many NAC products do a good job of fulfilling one or more of these functions, but none 
of the various products covers all five functions well.  ConSentry does well with regard to 
access control and identity-based resource control.  Microsoft’s forthcoming product is 
expected to do well with posture assessment and quarantine/remediation.  To cover all 
functions well, will probably require the use and integration of several products. 
 
On this project we determined a set of features we feel are necessary as part of our 
overall security posture.  Not all features will be practical on every system or device. 
o Pre-connect host posture assessment, quarantine, and remediation (This should 
include checking for the proper patch levels of the operating system, correct 
containment/countermeasure software is installed and running, and correcting 
deficiencies.  This should also inspect systems attempting connection for actively 
executing known viruses.); 
o Ongoing host posture assessment (to ensure containment/countermeasure 
software is not terminated during a connection session); 
o Network access control (Either user identity based or device based or both, if 
practical.); 
o Network resource control; 
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o Containment/countermeasure software (e.g. firewall, virus protection, anti-
spyware, intrusion detection, etc.). 
 
Sandia is already performing elements of posture assessment, identity-based network 
access control, and network resource control, but more could be done.  The situation 
should be analyzed to determine if it is necessary, useful, and cost effective to do more in 
these areas.  Sandia already deploys containment/countermeasure software as part of the 
Common Operating Environment for Microsoft Windows systems.  A future project may 
wish to examine the possibility of adding intrusion detection software to the individual 
systems. 
 
To tighten Sandia’s security posture in any of the areas listed above, analysis will be 
needed to determine what it will take to accomplish the desired task.  This analysis 
should include: 
o How much will it cost and how will it be funded; 
o A cost/benefit analysis; 
o What role will this task or feature play in Sandia’s overall security posture; 
o Can the project be completed quickly enough to make a difference; 
o If the project spans fiscal years, will continued funding be available; 
o Reliability of the solution; 
o Any vulnerabilities introduced by the solution; 
o Day-to-day operations; 
o Any other organizational impacts introduced by the solution. 
 
This project determined that IEEE 802.1x does work and is possible to use with Sandia’s 
network infrastructure.  The project was able to successfully test 802.1x with two-factor 
authentication.  It used both CryptoCards and Smart Cards.  However, each card is only 
useful on certain host operating systems and in certain use cases.  Further research is 
required to reduce the complexity of two-factor authentication.  The complexity is also an 
issue that affects system wide reliability.  Any project that addresses wide spread 
availability will need to consider authentication reliability.  With 802.1x, or any network 
access control system, any single failure in the authentication mechanism effectively 
disables the entire network. 
 
802.1x may be useful to Sandia in the future for switch port control, but is most 
immediately useful as part of the IEEE 802.11i standard for wireless network security.  
Limited deployment of 802.1x, via 802.1x enabled switches, may also be of immediate 
use to secure exposed wired ports in locations that are difficult to physically control or 
secure. 
 
Sandia should pursue investigation of more tools to effect host posture checking and 
client remediation.  This should include both the pre-connect host posture assessment, 
quarantine, and remediation, and the ongoing host posture assessment as defined above. 
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